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Option prices contain forward looking information about stock price volatility and, 
potentially, the probability of default. We develop a risk-neutral density (RND) model 
consisting of a mixture of two lognormal densities augmented with a probability of 
bankruptcy. To test the model we calibrate it to daily stock and option prices of six financial 
institutions during the onset of the 2008 financial crisis. We find that the addition of the 
probability of bankruptcy term substantially improves the quality of the fit of the RND. The 
bankruptcy probability and the shape of the RND for the institutions are examined, 
particularly on major event dates. We show that acquiring banks have lower bankruptcy 
probabilities than the acquired banks and that the RNDs of financial institutions reflect 
market shocks, especially through the implied bankruptcy probabilities.  
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It is interesting to observe how markets react to sudden or extreme changes in the financial 
environment and whether predictions of a financial crisis or bankruptcies can be observed in 
contemporaneous market prices. In particular, we use options data to generate market 
expectations of the future risk-neutral densities of stock prices to investigate whether the 
effects of news announcements and economic events are reflected in the option prices of 
financial institutions involved in the 2008 financial crisis. To improve the risk-neutral density 
model we explicitly include a probability of bankruptcy (or default) into our model for the 
risk-neutral density (RND). 
 
As options prices embed future predictions of stock price densities, it is possible that some 
information about the financial crisis could have been revealed sooner in the options markets, 
rather than in the equity markets. In particular, it might be possible to infer the probability of 
future bankruptcy from options data. Additionally, the inclusion of a specific probability of 
bankruptcy term in the RND may also be able to explain option prices better, especially 
during an economic crisis. 
 
To test our model we analyze the major events in the 2008 financial crisis to see if options 
data has any predictive power. We focus upon the forced mergers between JP Morgan (JPM) 
and Bear Stearns (BSC) on 13 March 2008, between Bank of America (BAC) and Merrill 
Lynch (MER) on 15 September 2008, and the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers (LEH) and the 
near failure of AIG on 15 September 2008.  
 
We find that a RND that consists of a mixture of lognormals and a probability of bankruptcy 
term (MLNbk) is able to reproduce the observed option prices far more effectively than 
competing models. For example, for Lehman Brothers over the period from January to 
September 2008, the mean squared option pricing error is 0.001 for the MLNbk model, 
compared to 0.202 for the standard lognormal (LN) and 0.003 for a mixture of lognormals 
(MLN). The probability of bankruptcy term is also non-trivial throughout the period. For 
example, from January 2008 until October 2009, AIG’s probability of bankruptcy averages 
4.53% with significant variation, peaking at a value of around 50%. 
 
From a day-to-day analysis of the individual banks we find direct support for the inclusion of 
a probability of bankruptcy term in our RNDs. As the acquired banks were relatively fragile, 
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we find that the acquired banks had a higher probability of bankruptcy. We also observe how 
even during extreme events like the financial crisis the risk-neutral densities provide a large 
amount of information about possible future events.  
 
Our research is primarily about the forward-looking bankruptcy information provided by 
option prices. An alternative source for such information is provided by spreads for credit 
default swaps, so this paper includes some comparisons between the probabilities implied by 
option and CDS markets. The option methodology requires more price inputs, but has the 
advantage that it estimates the entire risk-neutral distribution of future prices. 
 
We emphasise that all the probabilities obtained from option prices and CDS spreads are risk-
neutral. In theory, either a change in perceptions of real-world probabilities or a change in the 
market’s tolerance for risk changes is sufficient to explain a risk-neutral change. 
 
In the default probabilities and bankruptcy estimation field, various kinds of historical data 
have been considered. Accounting variables, such as the ratios of working capital to total 
assets, retained earnings to total assets, earnings before interest and taxes to total assets, 
market equity to total liabilities, and sales to total assets, were used by Altman [1968]. 
Zmijewski [1984] considered the ratio of net income to total assets, the ratio of total liabilities 
to total assets, and the ratio of current assets to current liabilities. Also, balance sheet data and 
debt information are considered by Bharath and Shumway [2008] and Amel-Zadeh [2011]. 
Among others, Agarwal and Taffler [2008] and Fabozzi, Chen, Hu and Pan [2010] used stock 
prices. Shumway [1999] found that many accounting ratios are poor predictors, while market 
driven variables are strongly related to the probability of bankruptcy. He found that larger, 
less volatile firms, with high past returns had lower risk of bankruptcy. However, Agarwal 
and Taffler [2008] found that market-based models are not superior to accounting-ratio-based 
models. 
 
The use of option prices to directly infer bankruptcy probabilities has been limited.1 An 
exception is Camara, Popova and Simkins [2011] who assume RNDs are composed of a 
                                                 
1 The Merton [1974] methodology provides bankruptcy information but relies on counterfactual assumptions 
about price dynamics. The restrictive assumptions of the model typically include: all liabilities mature on one 
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single lognormal density augmented with a probability of bankruptcy. To avoid the rigid 
shape of the lognormal density, we combine two lognormal densities augmented with a 
positive probability of bankruptcy (MLNbk). We find that this amendment causes the density 
shape to describe investors’ expectations well. For example, for Lehman Brothers the 
lognormal model with bankruptcy (LNbk) matches options with a mean squared error which 
is over thirty times larger than the corresponding error for the MLNbk specification. Recently, 
Chen and Fong [2012] illustrate mixtures of lognormal densities for a few banks during the 
2008 crisis, but do not consider a bankruptcy state. Birru and Figlewski [2012] discuss 
option-implied expectations for the U.S. equity sector during the fall of 2008, as revealed by 
RNDs for the S&P 500 index. 
 
There are two advantages to using options data. First, options prices are forward-looking 
measures which reflect aggregate risk-neutral expectations for the underlying stock price 
until expiry of the derivative contracts. Second, these data have a high level of information 
efficiency. Option-implied volatilities and densities have strong forecasting ability, especially 
when the forecast horizon is either one month or three months (Poon and Granger [2003], Liu, 
Shackleton, Taylor and Xu [2007], Shackleton, Taylor and Yu [2010]).  
 
In this paper, we estimate the daily RNDs of financial institutions during the financial crisis 
and observe how the RNDs react to major events. There are various methods to estimate risk-
neutral densities. For example, the quadratic implied volatility method is a simple and 
efficient way to estimate a risk-neutral density. Malz [1997a, 1997b] proposed estimating the 
implied volatility curve as a quadratic function of the Black-Scholes options’ delta and the 
method has been applied to equity markets by Bliss and Panigirtzoglou [2002], Liu, et al. 
[2007], and Taylor, Yadav and Zhang [2009]. A related methodology is explained in detail by 
Birru and Figlewski [2012]. 
 
Previous research has identified some advantages of a mixture of lognormal densities. Melick 
and Thomas [1997] extracted density function for crude oil futures from option prices and 
found that a mixture of lognormal distributions characterized market information better than a 
                                                                                                                                                        
known date, default triggered only at maturity, normally distributed asset returns (Hillegeist, Keating, Cram and 
Lundstedt [2004], Agarwal and Taffler [2008]). 
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single lognormal assumption. Jondeau and Rockinger [2000] compared the quality of risk-
neutral densities estimated from various models. They found that a method based on a 
mixture of lognormal densities provides a better fit to options prices with short-term maturity 
than other methods based on either a Hermite approximation or a jump-diffusion process. Liu, 
et al. [2007] showed the mixture density provide a better fit than the Malz method. We follow 
this literature and consider a mixed lognormal density with possible bankruptcy in this paper.  
 
The financial crisis period is a natural setting to test our model. First, we anticipate that the 
probability of bankruptcy will be non-trivial over this period and also the uncertainty of the 
period provides a robust test of competing RND models. As background, in 2007, an increase 
in subprime mortgage defaults triggered a liquidity crisis. The downgrading of mortgage-
backed securities made the lending market even worse. In interbank funding markets, banks 
became unwilling to provide liquidity to other banks. The resultant liquidity dry-ups, market 
declines and defaults led to the financial crisis (Allen and Carletti [2008], Brunnermeier 
[2009]).  
 
JP Morgan acquired Bear Stearns on 17 March 2008. Lehman Brothers declared bankruptcy 
on 15 September 2008. At about the same time, seeing the signs, Merrill Lynch announced 
that it had been sold to Bank of America. In related literature, the “forced merger” between 
JP Morgan and Bear Stearns was considered by Allen and Carletti [2008] and Rhee [2010]. 
The US government feared that the bankruptcy of Bear Stearns would cascade through the 
financial system and lead to a string of bankruptcies. The government forced relatively sound 
banks to merge with risky banks in order to stabilize the financial crisis and protect the public 
interest.  
 
There has been fruitful research into bank mergers. Previous research on mergers has focused 
on changes in market values, costs and revenues, and managerial efficiency (Focarelli, 
Panetta and Salleo [2002], Amel, Barnes, Panetta and Salleo [2004]). It is worth paying 
attention to how forced mergers affect the risks of the institutions involved. Generally, 
however, in the fields of default forecasting or bankruptcy forecasting, financial institutions 
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are excluded (Shumway [2001], Agarwal and Taffler [2008], Bharath and Shumway [2008]).2 
Unlike previous research, we compare the daily probability of bankruptcy for financial 
institutions during the financial crisis, especially before and after the announcement of forced 
mergers. In this paper, both the forced merger between JP Morgan and Bear Stearns and that 
between Bank of America and Merrill Lynch are considered. It is interesting to check 
whether the acquiring banks have lower implied bankruptcy probabilities than the acquired 
banks. Also, the paper includes the American International Group (AIG) and Lehman 
Brothers cases. We anticipate finding that the probability of bankruptcy increases when a 
bank is strongly expected not to survive, e.g. to be acquired or announce bankruptcy in the 
near future. 
 
Overall, our new model shows ex-ante bankruptcy chances and the shape of the risk-neutral 
density. This can provide valuable information for risk management, investment decisions, 
and policy decisions. It is expected to reveal that a large density in the left tail reflects market 




On March 11, 2008, the Federal Reserve announced a $200 billion Term Securities Lending 
Facility. As Bear Stearns was a small high-leveraged bank with large mortgage exposure this 
led to concerns about its future. On March 12, the late acceptance of an interest rate swap 
from Goldman Sachs was interpreted as a sign that Bear Stearns was in trouble, causing 
nervousness among its hedge fund clients. Bear Stearn’s liquidity dried up dramatically the 
next day.   
 
On March 14, the Federal Reserve Bank agreed to provide a $25 billion loan to Bear Stearns 
to provide liquidity for up to 28 days. To prevent instability in the credit default swap market, 
the government intervened in the merger between JP Morgan and Bear Stearns. On March 17, 
JP Morgan offered to acquire Bear Stearns at a price of $2 per share, dramatically different 
                                                 
2  These authors consider accounting-ratio data. Because the accounting rules, asset valuations and other 




from the shares’ traded price of around $80 one week earlier. On March 24, the offer was 
raised to $10 per share to pacify angry shareholders. JP Morgan completed its acquisition of 
Bear Stearns on May 30, 2008 (Brunnermeier [2009]).  
 
From March, 2008 onwards, Lehman Brothers was reliant on overnight funding from the 
Federal Reserve. On August 20, shares in Lehman Brothers had fallen by almost 66% from 
March prices and they held secret talks to discuss selling a major proportion of its shares to 
the Korea Development Bank. On September 9, as it became clear the deal would fail, 
Lehman’s shares plunged. The Federal Reserve Bank held a meeting with all the major banks’ 
representatives to save Lehman Brothers. However, on September 14 Bank of America 
abstained from bidding for Lehman Brothers without the government’s financial help. The 
next morning, Lehman Brothers announced bankruptcy. Fearing for the future, Merrill Lynch 
rushed into an agreement to be acquired by Bank of America. The offer by Bank of America 
was 70% higher than Merrill’s shares at the close on 12 September.    
 
AIG, the biggest commercial insurance provider in the US, had been active in the derivatives 
business, including credit default swaps which insure against corporate default. On August 7 
2008, AIG announced a higher than expected loss for large subprime write-downs. On 
September 15, AIG’s shares fell 93%. On September 17, to prevent the collapse of the giant 
insurer the Federal Reserve announced that it would lend AIG emergency funds in return for 
an 80% controlling stake. On November 9, AIG was granted a $150 billion government 
bailout plan (Brunnermeier [2009]). As AIG played such an important role in the US 
financial market, the US government provided bailouts to save it and to stabilize the financial 
market. In the end, it survived the financial crisis. The major events of these institutions are 




Market expectations are inferred from option prices and CDS spreads for six financial 
institutions during 2008 and 2009, with results also presented for Bear Stearns during the 




Volatility expectations implied by the option prices are compared with daily realized 
volatilities calculated from two-minute returns, obtained from prices in the TAQ database. 
The realized variance for day t  is the sum of squares of two-minute returns:














Daily end-of-day settlement options prices are obtained from OptionMetrics. The option 
contracts are American. We concentrate our analysis on short-term, out-of-the-money (OTM) 
option contracts for which the early exercise premia can be ignored. Call and put prices for 
contracts with the same strike and expiry contain the same information, so that ignoring in-
the-money (ITM) prices does not lose information when matching calls and puts are traded. 
A second advantage of OTM options is that they are more actively traded than ITM options.  
 
To simplify equations and calculations, the option contracts are assumed to be European and 
written on synthetic futures contracts, with futures and options always having matching 
expiry times. As is well-known, the synthetic futures price F depends on the spot price S, the 
risk-free rate r and the present value of dividends during the time T until the futures contract 
expires: 
 
)].(PV[ dividendsSeF rT 
 (1) 
The term r is calculated by Ivy DB from a term structure of zero-coupon interest rates, which 
is derived from Libor rates and Eurodollar futures prices. The dividends are extracted from 
OptionMetrics. 
 
Option prices for five strike prices and a common expiry date are required to estimate the 
most general specification of the risk-neutral density considered in this paper. For any day 
and firm, whenever option prices for calls and puts are available for five OTM strikes we use 
all of the OTM option prices; for a strike X, calls are defined to be OTM when FX  and 
puts are OTM when FX  .  The second nearest-to-maturity options are chosen whenever 
9 
 
they provide five or more OTM option prices. Table III reports that this is possible for 
between 67% (BAC) and 86% (LEH) of the days in our sample. 
 
When there are less than five available strikes for the second nearest contracts, we switch to 
the third nearest-to-maturity contracts if possible. When there are also less than five available 
strike prices for these contracts, we delete the sample day. In a few cases, there are sufficient 
strikes for the second or third nearest contracts but the sum of squared pricing errors, 
described in the next Section, is very high and more than ten times the standard deviation for 
the firm; we then use the nearest time-to-maturity, providing it has five available strikes and, 
furthermore, there are no dividend payments before the nearest expiry date. Table III shows 
that the nearest options are used for less than 5% of sample days, while the frequency for the 
third-nearest options varies from 12% (LEH) to 31% (BAC). 
 
There are a small number of cases when we can only obtain five or more available strikes by 
including ITM puts. This has been done for 16 days for AIG, four days for BAC, and one day 
each for BSC and MER. These cases occur when the spot price is low and there is either zero 
or one available OTM put. 
 
We have a satisfactory number of strikes for all days in our sample periods for JPM, LEH and 





Daily spreads for credit default swaps on senior debt are obtained from Bloomberg and 
Datastream. We choose a contract maturity of one year, rather than five years, because we are 
interested in default expectations over the shortest periods that can be revealed by market 
prices. The risk-neutral, implied probabilities of default are calculated using the method of 
Bharath and Shumway [2008]. Implementation of their method requires the market 
expectation of the recovery rate after any default. Sarbu, Schmitt and Uhrig-Homburg [2013] 
estimate an average implied recovery rate of 50% for the senior debt of financial companies, 
which is very similar to the average recovery rate for the banking sector in Jankowitsch, 








Many methods can be used to estimate risk-neutral densities from option prices, including 
several reviewed in Taylor [2005] and Figlewski [2009]. One of the most popular density 
specifications is a mixture of two lognormal densities, first proposed by Ritchey [1990] and 
applied in numerous studies including Melick and Thomas [1997], Brigo and Mercurio [2002] 
and Liu et al. [2007]. The mixture of lognormals (MLN) density has three more parameters 
than the lognormal (LN) density, which permits a variety of flexible shapes for the risk-
neutral density (RND). In particular, fitted MLN densities possess appropriate negative levels 
of skewness and positive excess kurtosis3. The MLN density also offers the possibility of 
interpreting the RND as the density of a process having two possible futures states, which 
might be associated firstly with bad news and secondly with good news.  
 
The MLN density for time T  assumes the underlying asset price will always be positive 
when options expire T  years after the present time.  We generalise the distribution of the 
future spot price to allow for bankruptcy, which is here identified with the extreme state 
0TS . We allocate weights 1  and 2  to two lognormal distributions and the remaining 
weight, 211   , to the probability of bankruptcy.4 
 
Our most general risk-neutral, cumulative distribution function (c.d.f.) for TS , at time zero,  
is 
                                                 
3 All fitted RNDs estimate the tails of the density by extrapolating outside the range of observed strike prices. 
The MLN tails are thinner than provided by alternative density models, such as the generalized extreme value 
tails assumed in Figlewski [2009] and Birru and Figlewski [2012]. 
4 Incorporating a positive chance of bankruptcy into the RND is an extreme way to fatten the left tail. There may 
be credible alternative ways to do this, but they are beyond the scope of our current research. 
11 
 
),(),(1)Pr()( 22211121  FxGFxGxSxG LNLNT  .           (2) 
This c.d.f. is defined by parameters ),,,,,( 212121  FF  and two lognormal c.d.f.s 
(.)LNG . The component lognormal distributions have expectations 1F  and 2F , and their 
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with (.)  the c.d.f. of the standard normal distribution. The risk-neutral, density function of 
TS  is defined for positive prices x by a linear function of lognormal densities: 
 


















and with (.)  the density of the standard normal distribution.  
 
For the risk-neutral measure Q, we always have FSE T
Q ][  with F representing the time-
zero, futures price defined by (1). Consequently, FFF  2211  . Additional constraints on 
the vector   are 1 2, 0,    1 2 1    and 1 2 1 2, , , 0.F F     All risk-neutral moments of the 













.                                (6) 
 
As the general distribution defined by (2) combines MLN and bankruptcy features we refer to 
(2) by using the acronym MLNbk. The MLNbk distribution has six parameters restricted by 
one equality constraint, so there are five free parameters. We claim later that MLNbk 
describes our option prices better than the following three special cases: (1) the lognormal 
(LN) distribution occurs when 11   and 02   and it has one free parameter (i.e. 1 ), (2) 
the lognormal with bankruptcy (LNbk) distribution of Camara, Popova and Simkins [2011] is 
given by 11   and 02   and has two free parameters ( 11, ), (3) the MLN distribution 
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excludes bankruptcy by requiring 121    and thus has four free parameters 
( 2111 ,,,  F ). Note that LNbk can be obtained as the special limiting case of MLN when 
02 F  and 2  is any fixed positive number. Consequently, we can state




European option prices are discounted, risk-neutral expectations of the option payoffs at 
expiry. The Black [1976] pricing formula for European options on futures is simply an 
application of risk-neutral pricing for a lognormal distribution, for which we represent call 
and put prices respectively by the notation ),,,( TFXcB   and ),,,( TFXpB  ; here X is the 
strike price, F is the time-zero futures price and   is the annualized volatility. Therefore, 
when the underlying asset price on the expiry date has a MLNbk distribution, at time 0 the 
theoretical price of a call option is given by: 
),,,(),,,()( 222111 TFXcTFXcXc BB   ,                                     (7) 
as call options are worthless if the firm is bankrupt. Put options are worth X if the firm is 
bankrupt, so their theoretical prices for the MLNbk distribution are: 
1 2 1 1 1 2 2 2( ) (1 ) ( , , , ) ( , , , )r T B Bp X e X p X F T p X F T           .              (8) 
These option prices depend on the time-zero futures price F through the risk-neutral 




All parameters are estimated by minimizing the average of the squared differences between 
traded prices for OTM options and the corresponding theoretical OTM prices. For a set of 









,                                         (9) 




A summary of the parameter estimates obtained from the option prices included in our study 
is provided by Tables III and IV. Table III summarises the values of H across the sample 
periods. As the distributions of the H-values are positively skewed, we state results for both 
means and medians. The LNbk distribution has two states (survive, with a lognormal 
distribution, or go bankrupt) and it fits the option prices more accurately than a single 
lognormal distribution. The median H for LNbk divided by the median H for LN varies from 
11% to 27% across institutions; the ratio of means varies from 16% to 34%. However, the 
LNbk distribution is simply a limiting case of the MLN distribution, which allows for two 
general states. When we compare H-values for LNbk and MLN we find the more general 
distribution has median values which are between 6% and 10% of the median values for the 
special case; the ratios are 8% to 12% for mean values. The MLNbk distribution is our most 
general specification and its values of H are a notable improvement upon all special cases. 
The MLNbk distribution has medians which are between 19% and 37% of the MLN medians, 
with mean ratios from 24% to 55%. 
                                            
                                  
Table IV shows the means and standard deviations of the estimated parameters for the 
MLNbk distribution. As is typical in the MLN literature for equity markets, the lower-
expectation state is less likely but more volatile, i.e. when 21 FF   then 21    and 
21   . The third state for MLNbk is seen to have a low average probability of bankruptcy 




We first use option prices to compare the risk-neutral probability of bankruptcy for the six 
financial institutions, contrasting the chances for acquiring, acquired, bankrupt and bailed-out 
institutions. It is important to remember that all the probabilities are risk-neutral; they will 
change if either real-world probabilities change or the market’s tolerance for risk changes. 
Next, we compare the probabilities extracted from option prices with those implied by CDS 
spreads. We find that similar information is revealed by the two sources. Finally, we provide 
separate case studies for each institution, and discuss changes in risk-neutral bankruptcy 




Comparison of the probability of bankruptcy across institutions 
 
Figure 1 shows the bankruptcy probability for the two acquiring banks, JP Morgan and Bank 
of America. The probability was less than 2% before September 20085. The probability of 
bankruptcy around the Bear Stearns crisis in March 2008 was generally smaller than around 
the Lehman Brothers failure in September 2008. The probabilities were relatively high from 
September 2008 to June 2009, while in the second half of 2009 they decreased to less than 
1%.  
 
The probability of bankruptcy for the acquired banks, Bear Stearns and Merrill Lynch, is 
shown in Figure 2. The respective probabilities on the acquisition dates are 27% (BSC, 
March 17) and 11% (MER, September 15); these are end-of-day probabilities, calculated 
after the announcements. The average probability of bankruptcy for the acquiring banks, 
calculated across the month prior to acquisition, is compared with that of the acquired banks 
in Table V. The acquiring institutions have lower averages, of 0.7% (JPM) and 0.9% (BAC), 
than those of the acquired institutions, which are 3.1% (BSC) and 2.3% (MER). These results 
are consistent with the market implying a higher chance of failure for the acquired institutions, 
reflecting beliefs that they are more fragile than the relatively sound acquirers. These results 
also provide support for the MLNbk model. 
 
Figure 2 also shows that the only bankrupt institution in our sample, Lehman Brothers, had 
the highest implied probabilities, which went as high as 54% on September 15, 2008; again 
this is a post-announcement probability. Figure 2 also shows that American International 
Group had high probabilities for several months after the Lehman bankruptcy. 
 
Comparisons of probabilities of bankruptcy implied by option contracts and credit 
default swaps 
 
Option prices provide implied risk-neutral probabilities of bankruptcy over relatively short 
time horizons defined by times to expiry, while one-year CDS prices provide probabilities 
                                                 
5They refer to varying time horizons, which are usually between 25 and 45 trading days. 
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over a one-year horizon. The two markets thus provide implied probabilities for different 
horizons, in the same way that two-month and one-year interest rates and implied volatilities 
provide two observations from the respective term structures. 
 
Table V shows the probability of bankruptcy averages during one-month periods preceding 
the key dates in March 2008 (for JP Morgan and Bear Stearns), and September 2008 (for the 
other four institutions). We observe that the six probabilities rank in the same order for both 
the options and CDS sources, so their rank correlation is one. This shows that the two sources 
agreed about the relative bankruptcy risks. As the average option lifetimes are just under two 
months it is not surprising that the option implied probabilities are smaller than the one-year 
CDS probabilities. Table V also shows the equivalent CDS probabilities over option lifetimes, 
after assuming a constant intensity for default for the next year. The option implied 
probabilities are then seen to be larger than the CDS probabilities, by factors varying from 
1.7 to 3.4. The higher option probabilities are consistent with a declining term structure of 
bankruptcy risk; during a crisis we expect a higher chance of bankruptcy during the next two 
months than during subsequent two-month periods. 
 
A second comparison of option and CDS information can be attempted by asking if one 
source leads the other in providing relevant information. Some evidence about relative timing 
is given by finding the correlation between the bankruptcy chance on day t from options data 
and the chance on day t  from CDS prices, denoted by r . We find 101  rrr  for three 
institutions (JPM, BAC, AIG), while 101  rrr  for two (BSC, MER) and 110  rrr  for 
one (LEH). We consider the evidence from these correlations to be inconclusive. 
 
Some visual comparisons are shown on Figures 3 and 6a, which confirm that the options and 
CDS probabilities provide complementary information. 
 
We now consider the option implied probabilities of bankruptcy for the financial institutions 
in detail, commencing with the two which were central to the March 2008 crisis, namely Bear 
Stearns and JP Morgan.   




Figure 3 shows that BSC had a bankruptcy chance below 2% before Monday March 10. As 
liquidity dried up, the probability increased reflecting rising fear among investors. On 
Monday March 17, JP Morgan offered to acquire Bear Stearns at a low price when the 
implied probability of bankruptcy was 27%. Figure 4 shows four examples of market 
expectations, as revealed by the estimated MLN and MLNbk risk-neutral densities, on March 
11, March 14, March 17 and April 1. The major events involving Bear Stearns during this 
period are as follows. 
 
On Tuesday March 11, the Federal Reserve announced a $200 billion Term Securities 
Lending Facility. Some investors might have read this as a sign that Bear Stearns might be in 
difficulty, because it was a small high-leveraged bank with a large mortgage exposure. The 
bankruptcy estimate rose to 3% which reflected the increasing bankruptcy risk. As can be 
seen from Figure 4, the means of the two lognormal components in the MLNbk density are 
$47 and $70. This could be interpreted as different market expectations about whether Bear 
Stearns was in difficulty. It is also seen that one lognormal component in the MLN density 
has a mean below $10. This information is partially reflected by the bankruptcy risk in the 
MLNbk distribution, which illustrates the key difference between the MLN and MLNbk 
distributions. The average pricing errors are 0.0170 and 0.0044, and the MLNbk distribution 
more accurately describes the expectations of investors over the options life until April 19. 
 
On Wednesday March 12, the late acceptance of an interest rate swap contract from Goldman 
Sachs was interpreted as a rejection and a sign that BSC might be in trouble. This 
misunderstanding was leaked to the media, causing nervousness among Bear Stearns’ hedge 
fund clients. The Bear’s liquidity dried up dramatically the next day. The probability of going 
bankrupt was again 3% and it increased on Thursday March 13 to 5%.  
 
On Friday March 14, JP Morgan and the Federal Reserve Bank agreed to provide a secured 
loan for up to 28 days to allow Bear Stearns to access liquidity and alleviate the need for a 
‘fire sale’ of mortgage-backed securities.6 The bankruptcy chance climbed to 11% and the 
                                                 




annualized realized volatility7 soared to 634%, reflecting the serious liquidity problem at 
BSC.  
 
The credit default swaps market could have become unstable without a rescue plan.8 To save 
the financial system from collapse, over the weekend of March 15 and 16 the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York helped to arrange a deal between JP Morgan and Bear Stearns. This 
emphasises that Bear Stearns was fragile and at high risk of bankruptcy. 
 
On Monday March 17, JP Morgan offered to acquire Bear Stearns at only $2 per share, far 
below its share price of $30 on March 14. The bankruptcy chance increased substantially 
again, to 27%, while realized volatility was again very high at 453%. The low price offer 
highlights the risks carried by investors during the credit crunch.9  
 
A week later, on Monday March 24, the offer to acquire was raised to $10 per share to pacify 
angry shareholders. On April 1, the Federal Reserve cleared the way for JP Morgan to buy 
Bear Stearns’ bank holdings. The bankruptcy rate decreased to 0.6% and Figure 4 shows the 
left tail of the risk-neutral density is now thinner, with far less chance of a very low future 
price. JP Morgan completed its acquisition of Bear Stearns on May 30, 2008 (Brunnermeier 
[2009]). 
JP Morgan (JPM) 
 
The market implied estimates of future bankruptcy are generally lower for JP Morgan than 
the other five institutions. Figures 1 to 3 show JPM is the only institution whose maximum 
bankruptcy probability is below 10%. The probability is below 2% until the crisis events of 
September 2008 and then increases, with most values between 2% and 4% until March 2009 
and then the values fall below 1%. Note that of the six banks that we study in detail, JPM also 
has a significantly lower realized volatility, also consistent with a lower probability of 
bankruptcy. The maximum realized volatility for JPM is 227%, notably below the next 
                                                 
7 Except for LEH, figures showing realized volatilities are omitted to conserve space. Realized volatilities are 
almost always below 100% before the crisis events. 
8 From http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1723152,00.html. 
9 From http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/e2206ed2-f380-11dc-b6bc-0000779fd2ac.html. 
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highest which is 384% for MER. The average realized volatility for JPM is 55%, while over a 
similar period including September, 2008, the next lowest is 67% for BAC10.  
 
As already discussed, Bear Stearns was acquired by the relatively stable JPM in March 2008. 
The estimated bankruptcy risk for JPM increased, temporarily, on March 17 to 2%. However, 
Figure 5 shows that on this day the risk-neutral distribution has low probabilities for future 
low prices. From Figure 5, the densities for four later days, discussed below, also confirm 
that JPM was perceived to be “relatively strong” between August 2008 and June 2009. 
 
On August 12, JPM reported a $1.5 billion write-down in July. JPM said that trading 
conditions in the mortgage market had seriously deteriorated in July due to cut-price sales of 
mortgage-backed securities; Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac had been less willing to support 
the market.11 The bankruptcy chance for JPM was then 0.8% and the risk-neutral density has 
a relatively fat left tail. This may reflect the credit conditions faced by JPM. 
 
On September 15, JPM was one of ten large banks which agreed to contribute together to 
provide a $70 billion liquidity fund to mitigate the expected failure of Lehman Brothers.12 
The bankruptcy chance for JPM moved up to 1.8%, which may reflect systemic credit risk as 
it was a relatively large and stable institution. 
 
On September 26, JP Morgan acquired Washington Mutual’s bank deposits, assets and its 
troubled mortgage portfolio from the Federal government and became the largest US 
depository institution.13 Because some of the transferred deposits were uninsured, investors 
had different viewpoints about the benefit of the acquisition to JPM. The bankruptcy chance 
of 1.5% and the long left tail in the risk-neutral density shows uncertainty about the medium-
term prospects of JPM.  
 
                                                 
10 BSC average realized volatility is 56% but this only covers the period until May, 2008. 
11 From http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/5b3f0ea2-67fa-11dd-8d3b-0000779fd18c.html. 
12 From http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/136a27d8-82d0-11dd-a019-000077b07658,dwp_uuid=11f94e6e-7e94-11dd-
b1af-000077b07658.html. 
13 From http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/f652afe0-8bf2-11dd-8a4c-0000779fd18c.html. 
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On May 7, 2009, a stress test by the government showed that JPM was adequately capitalized 
and was more able to repay bailout dollars than its peers.14 The announcement of the test 
result should have reassured investors and the bankruptcy chance fell to 0.6%. The 
pronounced left tail, seen in previous risk-neutral densities, disappears and the density 
becomes almost symmetric. This indicates that the market had few concerns about JP Morgan 
surviving the liquidity crisis. 
Lehman Brothers (LEH) 
 
Panel A of Figure 6 shows that the options market implied that Lehman Brothers was unsafe 
from mid-March 2008 until it went bankrupt six months later. Before the Bear Stearns crisis 
the bankruptcy risk was less than 1%, but it peaked at 9% on March 17 when Bear Stearns 
was rescued. Subsequently, the estimated risk fell for two months before rising again, 
reaching 19% on 11 September and then 54% on September 15 when LEH announced 
bankruptcy. 
 
Panel B of Figure 6 shows three measures of annualised volatility which all soar around 
March 17 and September 15; these measures are the realised volatility (RV), the conditional 
standard deviation from the GJR-ARCH model calculated from daily returns and the standard 
deviation of the MLN risk-neutral density. 
 
We now discuss some of the major events for Lehman Brothers in 2008. On January 17, 
having already lost 2,500 jobs, LEH announced plans to cut a further 1,300 jobs in its 
domestic mortgage division. At this time LEH did not have known liquidity issues, the 
estimated bankruptcy chance was less than 1% and the estimated risk-neutral densities, 
shown in Figure 7, do not reveal any market concerns. During March, however, LEH relied 
on overnight Fed funding to survive during the Bear Stearns crisis period. The bankruptcy 
rate reached 9% on March 17, when Figure 7 shows bimodal densities for the stock price one 
month later. One mode is at a few dollars while the other mode is above $40, so the 
information provided by the densities is evidence of major concern that LEH may collapse. 
                                                 
14 From 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/08/business/08bank.html?_r=1&scp=2&sq=stress%20test%20results%20may




On August 20, Lehman Brothers held secret talks to sell the majority of its shares to the 
Korea Development Bank. On Tuesday September 9, as it became clear the deal would fail, 
the LEH share price plunged. The estimated bankruptcy chance shot up to 18%, reflecting the 
negative news. On Thursday September 11, Lehman Brothers announced plans to contract as 
a way to survive the credit crisis. This news came after LEH reported its worst ever loss of 
$3.9 billion for the third quarter, spurred by $7.8 billion in credit-related write-downs.15 The 
bankruptcy risk remained at a high level, 19%, and Figure 7 now shows very low share price 
expectations. 
 
In an effort to save LEH, the Federal Reserve Bank held meetings with representatives of all 
the major banks. On Sunday September 14, Bank of America, lacking a government 
guarantee, withdrew from bidding for Lehman Brothers. The next morning, on Monday 
September 15, Lehman Brothers announced bankruptcy. For this day, and following the 
announcement, the realized volatility and bankruptcy chance rose to extremely high levels, 
respectively 1,058% and 54%.  
Merrill Lynch (MER) 
 
Comparing Figure 8 for Merrill Lynch with Figure 6 for Lehman Brothers shows similar 
expectations during the March 2008 crisis but important differences during the deeper crisis 
in September 2008. Both institutions experienced perceptions of weakness on March 17 and a 
bankruptcy estimate of 9%. MER, in contrast to LEH, does not have estimates above 10% 
before the weekend of September 13-14 when MER was able to arrange a sale to Bank of 
America. 
 
Before the Bear Stearns crisis, the MEL bankruptcy chance was less than 1%. This occurred 
despite the announcement on January 17 of a net loss of $7.8 billion, which included a $14.1 
billion write-down on investments related to sub-prime mortgages.16 The risk of bankruptcy 
then remained at a low level, 0.3%.  
                                                 
15 From http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/c4cb3b92-7f98-11dd-a3da-000077b07658.html. 




Later, on July 28, Merrill Lynch announced a $8.5 billion share offer and a $5.7 billion fire 
sale of toxic mortgage securities.17 The share return on this day was -12% and the probability 
of bankruptcy increased to 2.3%.  
 
On Sunday September 14, as its competitor Lehman Brothers was sinking, Merrill Lynch 
“reading the signs … announced … that it had sold itself to Bank of America for $50 billion” 
(Brunnermeier [2009]). This price was equivalent to $29 per share, which was 70% higher 
than Merrill’s most recent traded stock price. The realized volatility and bankruptcy chance 
on Monday September 15 were 172% and 11% respectively. The relatively high probability 
of future bankruptcy on this and subsequent days may reflect a lack of confidence either in 
the sale of MEL or in the strength of its rescuer. Figure 9 shows the estimated risk-neutral 
densities on September 15 are highly skewed to the left, with expectations far below $29. 
Bank of America (BAC) 
 
As shown by Figures 1 and 8, the market considered Bank of America to be relatively safe 
during the crises of March and September 2008, but less safe after these crises. The estimated 
probability of bankruptcy is 2% on September 15 and it is lower before then. There are 
several estimates around 5% later in 2008. These are followed by some estimates above 10% 
during the first half of 2009 and by much lower values later in the year. The five examples of 
BAC risk-neutral densities on Figure 10 show expectations falling as time progresses, 
because the share price falls, but they do not show high chances of very low prices in the 
future.  
 
On Saturday September 13, Bank of America was seen as the leading contender to buy 
Lehman Brothers, but the US government was reluctant to provide public backing for a take-
over.18 On Sunday September 14, Bank of America instead agreed to acquire Merrill Lynch.19 
The inferred probability of bankruptcy for BAC on Monday September 15 increased, but only 
to 2.1%, which reflects some level of systemic credit risk following the LEH bankruptcy.  
                                                 
17 From http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/3bf7930e-5cf4-11dd-8d38-000077b07658.html. 
18 From http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/306f879c-812c-11dd-82dd-000077b07658.html. 





On October 7, Bank of America reported its third quarter earnings which were less than 
analysts’ expectations. BAC said it would raise $10 billion of capital and cut its dividend in 
order to get through the credit crisis.20 The immediate response to the negative news was a 
one-day return of -30%. 
 
On October 14, the US government injected $250 billion into the US banking system. As part 
of their plan, BAC was to get $25 billion in government funds. In return, the government 
would take an equity position in the bank. 21  While the one-day return was 15%, the 
probability of bankruptcy went to 3.3%. Thus market concerns about another bankruptcy 
were not eliminated by the injection announcement. 
 
On Saturday December 20, S&P downgraded the ratings of six major US banks reflecting 
anxieties that financial crisis could be longer and deeper than previously expected. Bank of 
America’s acquisition of Merrill Lynch raised concerns, because MEL could generate more 
write-downs in commercial real estate and leveraged loans.22 On Monday December 22, the 
bankruptcy estimate was 1.9%.  
 
On January 15, 2009, BAC received a $138 billion bailout. The bailout was to be used to 
improve the balance sheet at the newly acquired MEL and to guarantee potential losses on 
‘toxic assets’.23 The BAC share price fell 20% on the day and the estimated probability of 
bankruptcy climbed to a new high level, of 12%. This clearly shows that market concerns 
were not alleviated by the bailout announcement. 
 
By May the bankruptcy estimates were falling. Nevertheless, on May 7, stress test results 
exposed Bank of America’s lack of capital to survive worst-case scenarios. The bankruptcy 
estimate was then 2.3%, compared with 0.6% for JP Morgan which was reported to be 
adequately capitalized. On May 20, BAC sold shares to raise $13.5 billion, which represented 
considerable progress towards meeting its capital-raising requirement. On June 3, US banks 
                                                 
20 From http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/50592a82-93fa-11dd-b277-0000779fd18c.html. 
21 From http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/395a0fa6-99f2-11dd-960e-000077b07658.html. 
22 From http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/8b20cc34-ce37-11dd-8b30-000077b07658.html. 
23 From http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/7ebeb6b0-e35c-11dd-a5cf-0000779fd2ac.html. 
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sold common shares and non-guaranteed debt to raise more money than required by 
regulators. Mutual funds and other large institutional investors bought shares aggressively 
and stock prices reflected the improving situation. BAC shares went up by 263% from 
March’s low point, while JPM was up 118%.24 With the improvement in liquidity conditions, 
the realized volatility and bankruptcy estimate decreased to 40% and 0.4%, respectively. The 
market gradually reverted to more normal conditions and the bankruptcy estimate was close 
to zero after August 2009. 
American International Group (AIG) 
 
As can be seen from Figures 1 and 2, AIG is the only financial institution in our sample to 
have several bankruptcy estimates above 20%, all of which occurred during 2008 after 
September 11. AIG was active in the derivatives business, including credit default swaps, 
which insure against corporate default. It was severely affected by the liquidity dry-up during 
the financial crisis. AIG received government bailouts between September 2008 and March 
2009 and consequently survived the financial crisis. Afterwards its implied probability of 
bankruptcy stayed low, and close to zero after August 2009.    
 
The estimated chance of bankruptcy is less than 3% in the first half of 2008, and increases 
after July 2008. On 7 August 2008, AIG announced a higher than expected loss for large 
subprime write-downs. The bankruptcy chance was then less than 1.5%. The slightly fat left 
tails of the risk-neutral densities in Figure 11 reflect concerns that AIG might perform worse 
in the near future. 
 
On Friday September 12, S&P put AIG on a negative credit watch, signaling a possible rating 
cut. The bankruptcy chance and realized volatility were 13.5% and 23.8%. On Monday 
September 15, AIG made a deal with the New York insurance regulators to add liquidity. 
Despite the deal, all the major rating agencies downgraded AIG’s long-term credit rating to 
reflect its losses from mortgage-related investments and credit derivatives.25 Its share price 
reflected the shock of the credit downgrades and the dramatic news about LEH and MER. 
                                                 
24 From http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124398503075879165.html. 




The daily return (change in the price logarithm) from Friday’s close to Monday’s close was -
93%. Panic is also shown by the very high realized volatility of 828%, and the bankruptcy 
risk estimate of 12%. The high volatility can be seen in Figure 11 which shows the fat tails of 
the risk neutral densities on September 12 and 15.  
 
On September 16, the Federal Reserve announced that it would lend AIG $85 billion in 
emergency funds in return for an 80% controlling stake. The implementation of a government 
stake was to prevent existing shareholders from taking advantage of a bailout. 26  The 
exceptionally high realized volatility of 1,237% and the bankruptcy risk of 11% indicate 
heightened fear about future uncertainty. 
 
On September 18, the world’s major central banks announced an injection of $180 billion to 
improve liquidity. This action led to a decrease in overnight interbank lending. But the 
continuing increase in longer-term interbank lending rates indicated that liquidity among 
banks remained suspect.27 The AIG return was 27%, and the realized volatility estimate 
decreased to 236%. This decrease reflects the positive features of the central bank actions, 
although strong concerns remain as the probability of bankruptcy increased to 22% on 
September 18. 
 
By October 24, AIG had borrowed three-quarters of the rescue fund set up by the government. 
The money was used to write down the bad debts which AIG guaranteed for other firms’ 
risky mortgage investments. The new CEO of AIG warned that the $123 billion fund 
provided by the government might not be enough to keep AIG afloat.28 Investors read this as 
a negative signal and the return was -21%. The bankruptcy chance was then very high at 35%.  
 
On Sunday November 9, AIG received a $150 billion government bailout to reduce interest 
payments and provide more time to sell assets.29 The bankruptcy risk decreased to 3% on the 
next day. 
 
                                                 
26 From http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/271257f2-83f1-11dd-bf00-000077b07658.html. 
27 From http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/e91b24b6-8557-11dd-a1ac-0000779fd18c.html. 
28 From http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/10/23/AR2008102303352.html. 
29 From http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/614586b4-ae9f-11dd-b621-000077b07658.html. 
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On March 2, 2009, AIG announced a fourth quarter loss of $61.7 billion, around $23 per 
share, most of which stemmed from write-downs of credit default swaps and debt. AIG could 
access $30 billion of new government capital and this prevented AIG from credit 
downgrades.30 After two weeks, the bankruptcy risk for AIG gradually decreased and stayed 




We have developed a risk-neutral density model that uses options prices and estimates the 
chance of bankruptcy under a risk-neutral measure. The MLNbk model extracts RNDs more 
accurately than other RND models including a standard mixture of lognormals and a 
lognormal with a bankruptcy term. The resulting density shows the market expectation of 
stock prices over the lifetime of the options as well as the probability of bankruptcy over the 
remaining lifetime of the options. This information is forward looking, allowing investors and 
risk managers the possibility to estimate the chances of future bankruptcies. 
 
We analyze in detail six major banks during the financial crisis period. As expected, when 
considering the forced merger cases we find a higher chance of bankruptcy for the acquired 
bank than for the acquiring bank. From analysis of the banks through key days in the 
financial crisis we see how the RND and probability of bankruptcy responds to news. We see 
that news announcements can have a significant effect on future bankruptcy probabilities as 
well as changing the shape of the RND. These case studies show in detail the information that 
can be obtained from option prices using the MLNbk model. 
 
Finally, credit default swap prices provide similar and complementary information about risk-
neutral perceptions of extreme future outcomes. Our RND models provide probabilities over 
short horizons, typically two months, in contrast to CDS probabilities for a year or more. We 
find that annualized measures of bankruptcy or default probabilities are higher from option 
                                                 
30 From http://www.reuters.com/article/GCA-CreditCrisis/idUSN0134457520090303. 
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prices during the financial crisis, reflecting that any default is more likely in the next month 
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
Table I Timeline of major events of financial institutions during financial crisis 
Date Event 
17 Jan 2008 Lehman Brothers announced to cut 1,300 jobs. 
Merrill Lynch announced a $7.8 billion loss. 
11 Mar 2008  The Federal Reserve announced $200 billion Term securities Lending 
Facility. 
14 Mar 2008  The Federal Reserve provided a $25 billion Loan to Bear Stearns. 
17 Mar 2008 JP Morgan offered to acquire Bear Stearns at a low price. 
24 Mar 2008 JP Morgan raised the acquiring price to $10 per share. 
28 Jul 2008 Merrill Lynch announced a $8.5 share offer and a $5.7 billion fire sale. 
7 Aug 2008  AIG announced a higher than expected loss for subprime write-downs. 
12 Aug 2008 JP Morgan Chase reported a $1.5 billion write-down. 
11 Sep 2008  Lehman Brothers announced to shrink its size. 
15 Sep 2008  Lehman Brothers announced bankruptcy. 
Bank of America acquired Merrill Lynch.  
16 Sep 2008  The Federal Reserve announced to lend AIG $85 billion. 
18 Sep 2008  The world’s main central banks announced $180 billion to improve 
liquidity. 
26 Sep 2008  JP Morgan acquired Washington Mutual. 
7 Oct 2008 Bank of America reported earnings which were less than analysts’ 
expectations. 
9 Nov 2008  AIG received a $150 billion government bailout. 
20 Dec 2008  S&P downgraded the rating of six major US banks. 
 
15 Jan 2009 Bank of America received a $138 billion bailout. 
7 May 2009 A stress report shown JP Morgan was adequately capitalized; Bank of 




Table II Sample periods, for estimating risk-neutral densities 
Institution     From   To 
Bear Stearns      BSC  July 2, 2007  May 30, 2008 
JP Morgan      JPM  January 2, 2008 October 30, 2009 
Lehman Brothers     LEH  January 2, 2008 September 12, 2008 
Merrill Lynch      MER  January 2, 2008  December 31, 2008 
Bank of America     BAC  January 2, 2008 October 30, 2009 
American International Group   AIG  January 2, 2008 October 14, 2009 
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Table III Summary statistics for average, squared pricing errors for each institution 
Distribution  BSC JPM LEH MER BAC AIG
LN Q1 0.1109 0.0238 0.0799 0.0473 0.0064 0.0182 
 Median 0.1993 0.0580 0.1200 0.0789 0.0224 0.0455 
 Q3 0.3996 0.1132 0.1972 0.1443 0.0569 0.1009 
 Mean 0.3390 0.0837 0.2025 0.1378 0.0423 0.0714 
 St. dev. 0.3928 0.0786 0.2881 0.1935 0.0537 0.0797 
        
LNbk Q1 0.0246 0.0055 0.0123 0.0073 0.0005 0.0019 
 Median 0.0518 0.0129 0.0266 0.0149 0.0024 0.0121 
 Q3 0.0934 0.0258 0.0428 0.0274 0.0108 0.0327 
 Mean 0.0779 0.0192 0.0333 0.0222 0.0084 0.0245 
 St. dev. 0.0823 0.0233 0.0311 0.0243 0.0130 0.0313 
        
MLN Q1 0.0019 0.0004 0.0009 0.0006 0.0000 0.0001 
 Median 0.0048 0.0012 0.0020 0.0012 0.0002 0.0007 
 Q3 0.0091 0.0024 0.0045 0.0028 0.0011 0.0021 
 Mean 0.0089 0.0023 0.0032 0.0026 0.0008 0.0020 
 St. dev. 0.0160 0.0036 0.0036 0.0040 0.0014 0.0037 
        
MLNbk Q1 0.0008 0.0001 0.0003 0.0002 0.0000 0.0001 
 Median 0.0016 0.0002 0.0006 0.0004 0.0001 0.0002 
 Q3 0.0030 0.0006 0.0010 0.0008 0.0004 0.0007 
 Mean 0.0027 0.0005 0.0010 0.0009 0.0003 0.0011 
 St. dev. 0.0044 0.0009 0.0022 0.0019 0.0007 0.0021 
        
First maturity used 3.6% 0.5% 2.2% 2.0% 2.0% 4.5%
Second maturity used 79.1% 77.8% 85.5% 83.8% 67.3% 73.9%
Third maturity used 17.3% 21.4% 12.3% 14.2% 30.6% 21.5%
Days with N>=5 196 463 179 253 447 330 
 
Days discarded, when N<5 35 0 0 0 15 119
 
Average value of N 18.9 18.0 17.3 17.8 12.9 18.8
The sample periods are listed in Table II. The summary statistics are for the quantity H defined by (9). N is the 







Table IV Parameter estimates for the MLNbk distribution when 1 2F F  
Parameter BSC JPM LEH MER BAC AIG 
1  Mean  0.3665  0.3685  0.3408  0.3633  0.3815  0.4615  
 Std. 
dev. (0.18) (0.13) (0.11) (0.12) (0.19) 
(0.26) 
2  Mean  0.6216  0.6217  0.6216  0.6114  0.6010  0.4973  
 Std. 
dev. (0.18) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.19) 
(0.28) 
1F  Mean  82.4566  31.6014  28.8626  28.4745  18.6043  23.6324  
 Std. 
dev. (31.93) (8.11) (14.63) (13.02) (10.47) 
(16.29) 
2F  Mean  104.1070  40.8272  41.2492  37.7377  25.1432  31.7486  
 Std. 
dev. (40.80) (6.73) (17.29) (15.27) (12.39) 
(20.75) 
1  Mean  0.6002  0.6278  0.9285  0.7714  0.6737  1.6802  
 Std. 
dev. (0.25) (0.24) (0.63) (0.29) (0.47) 
(4.22) 
2  Mean  0.5776  0.3483  0.4642  0.4154  0.5120  1.5256  
 Std. 
dev. (2.72) (0.13) (0.22) (0.20) (1.56) 
(3.55) 
1 21     Mean 0.0119  0.0099  0.0376  0.0253  0.0176  0.0412  
 Std. 
Dev. (0.03) (0.01) (0.09) (0.03) (0.02) 
(0.08) 
1F F  Mean  0.8675  0.8381  0.7891  0.8421  0.8050  0.8823  
 Std. 
dev. 
(0.21) (0.09) (0.18) (0.12) (0.16) (0.18) 
2F F  Mean 1.0964  1.1045  1.1737  1.1409  1.1401  1.3454  
 Std. 
Dev. 
(0.21) (0.06) (0.14) (0.10) (0.17) (0.65) 
The sample periods are listed in Table II.  
 
Table V Average percentage measures of bankruptcy risk 
 MLNbk CDS 
1 year/2 mths 
Period Options 
lifetimes 
JP Morgan 0.72 1.54/0.23 19 Feb. - 17 Mar. 2008 0.1504 
Bear Stearns 3.12 10.53/1.60 19 Feb. - 17 Mar. 2008 0.1454 
Bank of America 0.91 1.75/0.41 15 Aug. - 15 Sep. 2008 0.2333 
Merrill Lynch 2.29 8.76/1.37 15 Aug. - 15 Sep. 2008 0.1506 
Lehman Brothers 7.68 14.09/2.26 15 Aug. - 15 Sep. 2008 0.1506 
AIG 3.76 12.51/1.91 15 Aug. - 15 Sep. 2008 0.1446 
The tabulated probabilities are percentage averages across the month. The last column shows the average 
lifetimes of options (in years) used to obtain the MLNbk averages. The MLNbk probabilities are for the time 
until option expiry. The first CDS probability is for one year, while the second probability is for the option 






Figure 1: Bankruptcy risk of acquiring banks. The graph shows the risk neutral probability of 




 Figure 2: Bankruptcy risk of acquired banks and other financial institutions. The graph 
shows the risk neutral probability of bankruptcy, 1 21     from the MLNbk model. Notable 
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The bankruptcy risk of 
acquired banks and other financial institutions




Figure 3: Bankruptcy risks of BSC and JPM. The graph shows the risk neutral probability of 
bankruptcy, 1 21     from the MLNbk model. Notable dates are included on the graphs for 
information. The estimated risk-neutral implied bankruptcy probabilities from senior 1 year 
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Figure 4: Risk-neutral densities for Bear Stearns. These graphs show the risk-neutral 
densities on key dates during the forced merger between Bear Stearns and JP Morgan. 








Figure 5: Risk-neutral densities for JP Morgan. These graphs show the risk-neutral densities 
on key dates during the forced merger between Bear Stearns and JP Morgan. Dashed lines 










Figure 6: The bankruptcy risk and volatility of LEH. Panel A shows the risk neutral 
probability of bankruptcy, 1 21     from the MLNbk model. Notable dates are included on 
the graphs for information. The estimated risk-neutral implied bankruptcy probabilities from 
senior 1 year CDS spreads are denoted by CDSbk. Panel B shows three measures of volatility: 
the realised volatility (RV), the conditional standard deviation from the GJR-ARCH model 
calculated from daily returns (GJR(1,1)) and the standard deviation of the MLN risk-neutral 
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Figure 7: Risk-neutral densities for Lehman Brothers. These graphs show the risk-neutral 
densities on key dates during the collapse of Lehman Brothers. Dashed lines denote MLN 








Figure 8: The bankruptcy risks of BAC and MER. The graph shows the risk neutral 
probabilities of bankruptcy, 1 21     from the MLNbk model for Bank of America (BAC) 
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Figure 9: Risk-neutral densities for Merrill Lynch. These graphs show the risk-neutral 
densities on key dates during the forced merger between Merrill Lynch and Bank of America. 










Figure 10: Risk-neutral densities for Bank of America. These graphs show the risk-neutral 
densities on key dates during the forced merger between Merrill Lynch and Bank of America. 






Figure 11: Risk-neutral densities for America International Group. These graphs show the 
risk-neutral densities on key dates during the near collapse of AIG. Dashed lines denote MLN 
densities, solid lines denote MLNbk densities.  
 
